7 found
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  1.  47
    What is a person? What is the self? Formulations for a science of psychology.Raymond M. Bergner - 2017 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 37 (2):77-90.
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  2.  36
    Mental Disorder Is a Disability Concept, Not a Behavioral One.Raymond M. Bergner & Nora Bunford - 2017 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 24 (1):25-40.
    Certain things should never be taken for granted, among them... the precise meaning of words that are at the heart of your discipline.For a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word ‘‘meaning’’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.The prevailing state of affairs in the mental health field is one in which we have been unable to agree on a definition of our (...)
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  3.  32
    Mental Disorder Is Disability: In Support of Our Design.Raymond M. Bergner & Nora Bunford - 2017 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 24 (1):49-52.
    Although generally supportive of our overall position, both Zachar and Gala and Laughon raise questions about our research design. Herein, we respond to these questions by presenting counterarguments that support the soundness of this design.Subsequent to stating some broad agreement with our central thesis that mental disorder is best viewed as a disability concept and not a behavioral one, Dr. Zachar expresses a number of reservations about our work. We focus on the following discussion on what seem to be the (...)
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  4.  11
    The case against the case against free will.Raymond M. Bergner - 2018 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 38 (3):123-139.
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  5.  16
    What is behavior? And why is it not reducible to biological states of affairs?Raymond M. Bergner - 2016 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 36 (1):41-55.
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  6.  17
    Cognition: Unobservable information processing or private social practice?Raymond M. Bergner - 2006 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 26 (1-2):154-171.
    This paper presents a critique of cognitive psychology's micro-process program, as well as suggestions for a more scientifically and pragmatically viable approach to cognition. The paper proceeds in the following sequence. First, the mainstream point of view of contemporary cognitive psychology regarding cognitive micro-processes is summarized. Second, this view is criticized. Third and finally, cognitive science's neuropsychology program is discussed, not with respect to the considerable value of its findings, but with respect to the interpretation that would appropriately be placed (...)
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  7.  38
    Is It All Really Biological?Raymond M. Bergner - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):30-49.
    The hypothesis that our current psychological forms of description and explanation will one day be replaced by biological ones, while not universally held, is wide-spread and highly influential in both the scientific community and the broader culture. The purpose of this paper is to examine this hypothesis. It will be argued that, while biology has had and will undoubtedly continue to have many extremely valuable and illuminating findings, it cannot and will not replace psychological explanations and concepts in our understanding, (...)
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